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ABSTRACT
Neoclassical theory postulates that preferences between two goods are independent of the
consumer’s current entitlements.  Several experimental studies have recently provided strong
evidence that this basic independence assumption, which is used in most theoretical and applied
economic models to assess the operation of markets, is rarely appropriate.  These results, which
clearly contradict closely held economic doctrines, have led some influential commentators to call
for an entirely new economic paradigm to displace conventional neoclassical theory—e.g., prospect
theory, which invokes psychological effects.  This paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect
theory by investigating three clean tests of the competing hypotheses.  In all three cases, the data,
which are drawn from nearly 500 subjects actively participating in a well-functioning marketplace,
suggest that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers,
whereas consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical
predictions.  The pattern of results indicates that learning primarily occurs on the sell side of the
market:  agents with intense market experience are more willing to part with their entitlements than
lesser-experienced agents.  
John A. List
AREC and Department of Economics
University of Maryland
2200 Symons Hall
College Park, MD 20742-5535
and NBER
jlist@arec.umd.edu  1 
  Neoclassical models involve several fundamental postulates.  While most of the 
basic tenets appear to be reasonably met, the basic independence assumption—that 
preferences are independent of the consumer’s current entitlements—has been directly 
refuted in several experimental settings (see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., 1990; Ian 
Bateman et al., 1997).  Although numerous theories have been advanced to explain this 
anomaly, perhaps the most accepted conjecture invokes psychological effects, and is 
broadly termed “prospect theory” (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1979).1   
Even though considerable laboratory evidence in favor of prospect theory has 
accumulated, some economists believe the anomaly is merely the result of a mistake 
made by inexperienced consumers and through time these consumers will learn, and their 
behavior will more closely match predictions from neoclassical models (e.g., Peter Knez 
et al., 1985; Don Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987).  Yet, this evidence 
has not been entirely convincing, as critics argue that overall the data do not conclusively 
support the learning premise (e.g., Jack Knetsch and J.A. Sinden, 1987).  In light of 
arguments in Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth (1999), who note that useful cognitive 
capital most likely builds up slowly over months or years rather than in the limited 
duration of a laboratory experiment, it is understandable that this important debate 
remains unresolved. 
The major goal of this study is to extend the generality of the experimental 
learning results by examining individual behavior within a well-functioning marketplace.  
My investigation is unique in that my experimental laboratory is an actual marketplace.  
                                                           
1 Richard Thaler (1980) first coined the term “endowment effect”, which implies that a good’s value 
increases once it becomes part of an individual’s endowment.  Following the literature, in the remainder of 
the paper I will refer to the anomaly as the endowment effect.  The interested reader should see Elizabeth 
Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer (1993), who provide a nice explanation of other theories.   2 
This approach provides me with an opportunity to observe behavior of agents that have 
endogenously chosen certain roles within the market, such as being an intense or casual 
consumer, while simultaneously making use of certain controls afforded by an 
experiment.  A major advantage of examining behavior in a naturally occurring market is 
that subjects would be engaging in similar market activities (e.g., buying, selling, and 
trading commodities) regardless of whether I ran a field experiment or was a passive 
observer.  This added realism highlights the naturalness of this particular setting.  
My experimental investigation pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by 
investigating three clean tests of the competing hypotheses.  In the first test, I vary the 
endowment point across agents and examine individual trading rates of everyday 
consumable goods.  Prospect theory predicts a pattern of trading that depends on the 
nature of current entitlements, whereas neoclassical theory predicts a pattern of trading 
independent of entitlements.  In the second and third tests, I elicit statements of value in 
actual market auctions.  The auction treatments provide data that permit a comparison of 
Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating surplus as well as a measure of 
the shape of compensation demanded (Hicksian equivalent surplus) in the number of 
relinquished goods.  In these treatments, prospect theory predicts that Hicksian equivalent 
surplus will exceed Hicksian compensating surplus and that compensation demanded is 
concave in the number of relinquished goods.  Neoclassical theory predicts equivalence 
of surplus measures and that compensation demanded is convex in the number of 
relinquished goods.   
Besides these three tests, a key consideration of this study revolves around 
understanding how the actual market learning process evolves.  In particular, if   3 
preferences are influenced by market experience, what is the underlying learning process 
at work?  Also, since an appropriate understanding of the benefits and costs of public 
programs is necessary before efficient policies can be advanced, this study explores 
whether the market findings spill over to the realm of collective choice mechanisms.    
The empirical results are sharp and provide three major insights.  First, individual 
trading rates for inexperienced consumers are consonant with predictions from prospect 
theory.  The endowment effect anomaly is not universal, however:  consumers that have 
significant market experience do not exhibit behavior consistent with prospect theory; 
rather, their behavior is in line with neoclassical predictions.  Empirical findings are 
similar over collective choice mechanisms. Second, these results extend quite well to 
auction data: whereas Hicksian equivalent surplus is considerably larger than Hicksian 
compensating surplus for inexperienced agents, the difference converges to zero for 
experienced agents.  The observed convergence is entirely due to lower Hicksian 
equivalent surplus values among experienced agents.  Third, consistent with the pattern 
of results in the first two tests, compensation demanded is convex (concave) in the 
number of items being relinquished for experienced (inexperienced) agents.  
Overall, the data pattern observed suggests that the learning process at work is 
one where the psychological effects at the heart of prospect theory are gradually 
attenuated:  experienced agents are more willing to part with their endowments than 
lesser-experienced agents.  In this sense, the data are consistent with the notion that via 
previous market interaction and arbitrage opportunities, agents have learned to treat 
goods leaving their endowment as an opportunity cost rather than a loss.  This result is 
congruent with George Loewenstein and Kahneman (1991), who report that the main   4 
effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good one owns but rather the 
pain of giving it up.  Thus, while psychological effects have been extremely popular in 
explaining the endowment effect anomaly, they may also have some explanatory power 
regarding the attenuation of the anomaly.   
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  The next section provides a 
brief background and discusses the experimental design.  Sections II and III present the 
results and conclusions.   
I.  Background and Experimental Design 
Ever since the initial experimental findings that suggested mere ownership of a 
good may induce an endowment effect, neoclassical models have been under heavy 
scrutiny, as their basic independence assumption is clearly violated in such scenarios.  
The treatments herein extend the work of Knetsch (1989) and Bateman et al. (1997), 
among others.  In an influential study, Knetsch (1989) examined trading rates among 
Cornell undergraduate students and found that 89 percent of those originally endowed 
with a mug chose to keep the mug, and 90 percent of those endowed with a chocolate bar 
decided to keep the chocolate bar.  Since subjects were allocated to one of the two 
treatments randomly, a finding of less than 50 percent of the subjects swapping their 
good provides evidence in favor of prospect theory.   
Bateman et al. (1997) use a unique experimental design to provide a further test of 
prospect theory.  Making use of divergences in predictions between neoclassical theory 
and prospect theory, they use a classroom experiment to test the theories side-by-side.  
Their experiment was carefully designed to satisfy important criteria necessary for a 
clean comparison—e.g., incentive-compatible elicitation mechanism, explicit control for   5 
Hicksian income and substitution effects, etc.  Like Knetsch (1989), Bateman et al. 
(1997) find evidence in favor of prospect theory.   
A related line of research suggests this anomaly is attenuated when agents obtain 
significant market experience (Knez et al., 1985; Coursey et al., 1987; Brookshire and 
Coursey, 1987; List, 2003).  The current study is most closely related to List (2003), who 
controlled for Hicksian income and substitution effects by examining trading rates of 
unusual pieces of memorabilia in the field.  List’s (2003) field observations indicate an 
inefficiently low number of trades for naïve traders, consistent with prospect theory.  But 
his data show that market experience and the decision to trade in his experiment are 
positively correlated.   
Given that List (2003) was not primarily interested in testing the major theories, 
his results are open to interpretation.  First, his data may not properly delineate between 
prospect theory and neoclassical theory because experienced agents may have planned on 
re-selling the good.  The importance of this deficiency is highlighted in Kahneman et al. 
(1990, p. 1328), who note “there are some cases in which no endowment effect would be 
expected, such as when goods are purchased for resale rather than for utilization.”  Thus, 
the data pattern observed may be driven by spurious correlation, as practiced consumers 
may have planned on re-selling the good after the experiment.2  In this sense, the 
constructed market bore resemblance to a market where pure arbitrage was approached.   
Second, the extant literature typically reports endowment effects for everyday 
consumable goods, such as mugs and candy bars.  Accordingly, there is little doubt 
whether subjects have well-structured preferences for the goods used in these 
                                                           
2 Although in an exit interview List’s (2003) subjects stated that they planned to keep the good for personal 
consumption, critics could contend that this was a case of experimenter satisficing.     6 
experiments.  Since List (2003) used several unique pieces of memorabilia, which most 
of the subjects had never previously seen, or heard of, his findings may indicate that 
experienced subjects are more certain of their preferences (or the goods’ values) and 
therefore trade more often than lesser-experienced agents.3  Or the results might be 
suggesting that certain classes of sportscard show consumers derive utility merely from 
trading (perhaps this is the reason they participate in the sportscard market in the first 
place).  With an eye toward testing the competing hypotheses, and more fully exploring 
learning effects, I turn to the experimental designs. 
Experimental Design IA 
As a first attempt to resolve these and other issues, I examine trading rates of 
everyday consumable goods (mugs and candy bars) in an actual marketplace where 
subjects typically engage in buying, selling, and trading of sportscards and memorabilia.  
This exercise represents a particularly strict test of the role of market experience on 
shaping preferences since psychological research suggests that transfer of learning across 
situations is quite weak (Loewenstein, 1999).   
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental design.  Points A, B, C, and D are the initial 
endowment levels.  Point A = (0,1), B = (1,1), C = (0,0), and D = (1,0), where (University 
of Arizona coffee mug, chocolate candy bar) represent the endowed goods.  For example, 
subjects in treatment group B are endowed with 1 mug and 1 chocolate bar.  The 
University of Arizona coffee mug was an attractive red and white mug that retailed for 
                                                           
3 Lesser-experienced agents may keep their endowed good simply to avoid making embarrassing mistakes. 
Thus, if one takes into account informational asymmetries, neoclassical theory and prospect theory have 
identical predictions for inexperienced agents.   
   7 
$5.95 at the University of Arizona bookstore.  The candy bar was an extra large fine 
Swiss chocolate bar that retailed for about $6.00 at most fine-retail outlets.   
The fundamental insights gained from the treatments come from the choices 
subjects make to trade their endowment for another point in Figure 1.  In Treatment B 
(C), subjects are endowed with B (C), and must trade their position 1,1 (0,0) for either A 
or D (e.g., they choose A or D and give up B (C)).  The decision is therefore which of the 
two points, A or D, to choose.  Likewise, in Treatment A (D), subjects who are initially 
endowed with a candy bar (mug) decide whether to trade for a mug (candy bar).  Hence, 
the subject can either keep her initial endowment or trade it for the other good.   
The four treatments were run on the floor of a sportscard show in Tucson, 
Arizona.4  Each participant’s experience followed three steps: (1) completing a survey, 
(2) considering the potential trade, and (3) concluding the transaction and exit interview.  
In Step 1, the monitor approached individuals entering the marketplace and inquired 
about their interest in filling out a survey that would take about five minutes.5  If the 
individual agreed, the monitor explained that in return for completing the survey the 
                                                           
4 Many readers may be unfamiliar with sportscard shows.  With the rise in popularity of collector 
sportscards and memorabilia across the U.S. in the past two decades, markets have naturally arisen that 
organize buyers and sellers.  Temporal assignment of the physical marketplace is typically done by a 
professional association or local sportscard dealer who rents a large space, such as a gymnasium or hotel 
conference center, and allocates six-foot tables to dealers for a nominal fee.  When the market opens, 
consumers mill around the marketplace, higgling and bargaining with dealers, who have their merchandise 
prominently displayed on their six-foot table.  The duration of a typical sportscard show is a weekend, and 
a lucrative show may provide any given dealer hundreds of exchange opportunities (buying, selling, and 
trading of goods).  I should note that collector markets, such as the sportscard market, are much more than 
fringe activities in the U.S.:  the Beckett Fact Sheet notes that their collector sportscard magazines have a 
paid circulation of over 889,000 copies.  This circulation rate is comparable to popular magazines such as 
Gourmet,  Jane, and the New Yorker (see: http://www.beckett.com/publications/ and 
http://asme.magazine.org (American society of magazine).  Considering collectors broadly, according to 
the U.S. Mint 2000 Annual Report, "an estimated 125,000,000 American adults collect Q50 Quarters from 
pocket change with one-third collecting more than 25 of each state from pocket change, and the popularity 
of the program only increases with time."  See http://www.mint/gov).  Relatedly, according to a March 13, 
2000 article, the universe of stamp collectors includes 6,830,000 people (see: 
http://www.linns.com/print/archives/20000313/editor.asp).   
5 The survey is contained in Appendix A and is similar to List (2001).   8 
subject would receive her endowed good(s).  After physically giving the subject the 
appropriate endowment (when applicable), the subject proceeded to fill out the survey.  
No time limit was imposed.  In Step 2, the monitor informed subjects in Treatments B 
and C that they must trade their endowment for either point A or D, as represented in 
Figure 1.  In treatment A (D), the monitor informed the subject that she had the 
opportunity to trade her candy bar (mug) for the mug (candy bar).  The monitor allowed 
the subject to inspect both goods.  Step 3 closed the experiment and included an exit 
interview.   
I conducted some of the treatments with professional dealers and others with 
ordinary consumers.  The design was used to capture the distinction between consumers 
that have intense trading experience (dealers) and those that have less trading experience 
(nondealers).  In the nondealer treatments, the endowment point was changed at the top 
of each hour, so subjects’ treatment type was determined based on the time they visited 
the table at the card show.  The dealer treatments took place in the same fashion as the 
nondealer treatments, with one exception:  instead of waiting for participants to arrive at 
the table, the monitor visited each dealer at her booth before the market opened, 
alternating the endowment point.  The nondealer treatments took approximately fourteen 
hours to complete (11am to 6pm on Saturday and Sunday), while the dealer treatments 
took about four hours (7am to 11am on Saturday).   
A few aspects of the experimental design merit further consideration.  First, note 
that subjects received the good(s) as payment for completing the survey, and had the 
good(s) in their possession while filling out the survey.  These two attributes have been 
found to strengthen significantly the predictive accuracy of prospect theory.  Second,   9 
when performing this type of trading exercise, care should be taken to select goods of 
approximately equal value to avoid a result of everyone selecting one type of good.  In a 
market pre-test at a June 2001 Tucson trading card show, I asked fifty dealer and 
nondealer subjects to choose one of the two items.  Twenty-six chose the coffee mug, 
whereas twenty-four chose the chocolate bar.  I therefore concluded that the goods were 
similar enough in value to use for a trading exercise.  Third, no subjects participated in 
more than one treatment.  Fourth, the monitor worked one-on-one with each subject. 
Experimental Design IB 
Besides these four treatments examining strictly private allocations, because the 
existence of non-neoclassical preferences has vast importance for the provisioning of 
public goods, I also ran four treatments using a collective choice mechanism.  The four 
collective choice treatments (denoted AP, BP, CP, DP) use the identical consumable 
goods that were used in the private allocation treatments.  For example, in Treatment AP, 
subjects are endowed with a candy bar and must vote on a proposition to fund “Mr. 
Twister”, a small metal box placed at the front of the room.  If the group chooses to fund 
Mr. Twister, which is determined via simple majority rule, all N (number of subjects in 
the room) subjects must give their candy bar to the monitor; upon payment, Mr. Twister’s 
handle is cranked N times and N mugs are delivered.  Treatments BP, CP, and DP are the 
public good analogs of Treatments B, C, and D.   
Because it was necessary to have group decisionmaking, I used an adjacent room 
in the same building instead of running these treatments on the floor of the sportscard 
trading show.  In these treatments, each participant’s experience typically followed two 
steps: (1) consideration of the invitation to participate in an experiment that would take   10  
about 30 minutes, and (2) participation in the experiment.  In Step 1, the monitor 
approached potential subjects entering the trading card show and inquired about their 
interest in participating in an experiment that would take about 30 minutes.  If the 
individual agreed to participate, the monitor briefly explained that in return the subject 
would earn the chance to receive consumable goods at the experiment.  The monitor 
explained that at a pre-specified time (11:30am, 1:30pm, 2:30pm, and 3:30pm Sunday) 
the subject should enter an adjacent room to take part in the experiment.  Directions to 
the room were provided and the subject was informed that she would receive instructions 
for the experiment when she arrived.   
Step 2 began when subjects entered the room and signed a consent form in which 
they agreed to abide by the rules of the experiment.  After subjects were situated in the 
room, the experiment began.  The instructions, which are contained in Appendix B, were 
read aloud, and after everyone understood the mechanism, a vote to fund Mr. Twister was 
taken.  Each subject filled out her own decision sheet (a sample decision sheet is provided 
in Appendix C).  Similar to the private good treatments, no subjects participated in more 
than one treatment, and I randomized subjects into treatments to ensure an equal 
representation across referenda.  Finally, I used only nondealers in these treatments 
because dealers could not leave their tables to participate. 
Theoretical Predictions 
Under individual or group choice, neoclassical theory and prospect theory have 
sharp and disparate predictions about behavior across the various endowment points.   
Consider the Hicksian indifference curve in Figure 1.  For preferences to be consistent 
under neoclassical theory, the proportion of subjects who trade the mug for the chocolate   11  
bar should be equal to one minus the proportion who trade the chocolate bar for the mug.  
Thus, if 70 percent of the subjects endowed with a chocolate bar keep the chocolate bar, 
for preferences to be Hicksian, approximately 70 percent of subjects endowed with a mug 
should trade for a chocolate bar.  Similarly, for points B and C there should be 
independence between the point of endowment and the final entitlement. 
Alternatively, prospect theory conjectures that a value function exists that is (i) 
measured over deviations from a reference point, (ii) convex for losses and concave for 
gains, and (iii) initially steeper for losses than gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).  
Hence, prospect theory conjectures that mere ownership of a commodity will induce a 
kink at the point of endowment, making the proportion of subjects who opt to trade the 
mug for the candy bar considerably less than one minus the proportion who trade the 
candy bar for the mug.  Likewise, prospect theory predicts that subjects endowed at 
points B and C will opt for point D more often than subjects initially endowed at point A.  
This same prediction holds when one compares reference points D and B (or D and C)—
if prospect theory is an accurate predictor of behavior, then a larger proportion of subjects 
starting at points B and C will choose A.   
In summary, neoclassical theory predicts that if the goods are equally valued, 
roughly 50 percent of subjects will exit the experiment with a coffee mug and 50 percent 
of the subjects will exit with a chocolate bar, regardless of their random treatment 
assignment.  Alternatively, prospect theory conjectures that losses loom larger than 
comparable gains; hence changing the reference point matters.  Under prospect theory, 
the likelihood of leaving with a mug is ordered as follows:  those endowed at point D are   12  
most likely to leave with a mug, followed by subjects randomly allocated to points B and 
C; finally, subjects endowed at point A will be least likely to exit with a mug.   
Experimental Design II 
In an effort to provide a further test of individual preferences, I examine explicit 
statements of willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) in an incentive-
compatible elicitation mechanism: a Vickrey sealed bid second-price auction.6  Figure 2, 
which assumes quasi-concave utility functions, illustrates the experimental design.  In 
Figure 2, G represents extra large fine Swiss chocolate bars and $ denotes dollars (note 
that while numerical subscripts on g represent number of candy bars, subscripts on $ are 
for notational convenience only and do not depict actual dollar figures).  To gather 
statements of value, I randomly endow subjects at (g0,$3) or (g3,$0).  Subjects endowed at 
(g0,$3) state three Hicksian compensating surplus (WTP) values: their maximum WTP for 
g1-g0, g2-g0, and g3-g0 units of G (denoted WTP1, WTP2, and WTP3).  Likewise, subjects 
endowed at (g3,$0) state three Hicksian equivalent surplus (WTA) values:  their minimum 
WTA to sell one, two, or three of their candy bars (e.g., to relinquish g3-g2, g3-g1, and g3-
g0 of their candy bars, denoted WTA1, WTA2, and WTA3).7  Each of the subjects knew 
that only one of the three auctions, to be determined randomly, would be carried out for 
real.   
                                                           
6 The import of this robustness test is highlighted by one important lesson from the experimental literature:  
market institutions matter (see, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, 1982).   
7 A simple exercise of randomly allocating subjects at (g3,$0) and (g0,$0) and eliciting minimum WTA and 
maximum WTP values does not yield tremendous insights since both prospect theory and neoclassical 
theory predict a value disparity.  Neoclassical theory predicts divergence due to income (shifts in the 
indifference curve) and substitution (curvature of the indifference curves) effects.  This can be seen in 
Figure 2 by noting WTA3=$3-$0 > WTP3=$0-$4.  Prospect theory invokes psychological effects to predict 
divergences.  Thus, it is important to control for Hicksian income and substitution effects by compensating 
WTP subjects to ensure that subjects are moving along the same indifference curve.  The amount of 
compensation used in the WTP treatment is the average WTA3.   13  
The treatments were run on the floor of a sportscard show in Tucson, Arizona.  
Each participant’s experience followed four steps: (1) completing a survey, (2) learning 
the auction rules, 3) considering the bid (offer), and (4) concluding the transaction and 
exit interview.  In Step 1, the monitor approached individuals entering the trading card 
show and inquired about their interest in filling out a survey.8  If the individual agreed, 
then the monitor explained that in return for completing the survey the subject would 
receive an endowment (either three candy bars or the dollar value equivalent of the three 
candy bars—see footnote 7).  After the monitor physically gave the subject the 
appropriate endowment, the subject proceeded to fill out the survey.  The monitor worked 
one-on-one with the participant and no time limit was imposed.  In Step 2, the monitor 
informed the subject that she now had the opportunity to bid (offer) in an auction for the 
goods on the table (their goods).  After inspecting the goods, the subject learned the rules 
of the Vickrey second-price auction as well as the randomization mechanism (Appendix 
D contains the experimental instructions).   
In the WTP (WTA) treatment, after completing the survey, learning the auction 
rules, and examining the goods, each participant privately wrote three bids (offers) on the 
bidding sheet and placed it in an opaque box.  The monitor informed the participant that 
her bidding sheet would not be opened until after the show and that all bids/offers would 
be destroyed when the research project was completed.  Each subject worked one-on-one 
with the monitor and no time limit was imposed on her inspection of the goods.  In Step 
4, the monitor explained that if the participant won the auction, she would be contacted 
by email or telephone within three days.  Upon receipt of payment, the monitor would 
send her the candy bars (or money), postage paid. 
                                                           
8  The survey is identical to Appendix A.    14  
Before proceeding, I should mention a few important aspects of the experimental 
design.  First, subjects were randomly placed into either the WTA or WTP treatment, and 
competed against others in the same treatment.  Second, no subject participated in more 
than one treatment.  Third, since I am not testing the incentive-compatibility of the 
mechanism, and want to avoid any excess noise, I informed subjects that it was in their 
best interest to bid (offer) their true value in the auctions.  I reinforced this notion via 
several examples that illustrated the optimal strategy of truth-telling.  Fourth, I included 
only nondealers in the treatments since dealer availability was limited at this particular 
show.  Fifth, each subject in the WTP treatment received the dollar value equivalent 
(average WTA3 = $14.78) of the three candy bars received by the WTA subjects. 
Theoretical Predictions 
  Across these auction treatments neoclassical theory and prospect theory have 
sharp and quite disparate predictions.  A first difference in predictions is that neoclassical 
theory conjectures WTA3 = WTP3, whereas prospect theory predicts WTA3 > WTP3.  
This first test therefore represents a fundamental examination of whether individuals’ 
indifference curves are perfectly reversible—the basic independence assumption.  This 
test is similar to the trading exercise in Experimental Design IA.  Any other comparisons 
of WTA and WTP are not enlightening since both theories predict a disparity—offers and 
bids represent movements along different segments of the same indifference curve.9 
While further comparison of WTA and WTP values may not yield considerable 
insights, indifference curve convexity implies convexity of the expenditure function in 
                                                           
9 This is true unless there is infinite substitutability between money and candy bars, in which case 
neoclassical theory predicts no value disparity, whereas prospect theory predicts divergences.   15  
g.10  Because the expenditure function is strictly convex in g, compensation demanded 
will also be strictly convex in g.  In this case, neoclassical theory yields several 
predictions about the nature of compensation demanded in the number of goods 
relinquished: 2WTA1<WTA2, 3WTA1<WTA3, 3WTA2<2WTA3, and 
WTA1+WTA3<2WTA2. 
Alternatively, as previously mentioned, a major conjecture in prospect theory is 
diminishing sensitivity, or that small gains are disproportionately more attractive relative 
to large gains, and small losses disproportionately aversive relative to large losses.   
Intuitively, convexity of the value function in losses is motivated by the idea that the 
decline in value from a loss of $1100 to a loss of $1200 is less than the decline in value 
from a loss of $100 to a loss of $200.  Convexity of the loss value function implies 
concavity of compensation demanded.  Thus, again prospect theory has predictions that 
are directly at odds with neoclassical theory:  2WTA1>WTA2, 3WTA1>WTA3, 
3WTA2>2WTA3, and WTA1+WTA3>2WTA2.11 
II.  Results 
Table 1 provides a statistical description of the subject characteristics in each of 
the ten treatments as well as a summary of the experimental design.  In total, I observed 
behavior of nearly 500 subjects− more than 30 subjects in each dealer and non-dealer 
                                                           
10 This fact can be proven as follows: if the utility function u(g,$) is quasi-concave in (g,$), then the set 
S(q,u*) ={$|u(g,$) ≥  u*} is convex.  Because S(g) is convex, the set λ S(g0) + (1-λ )S(g1) ⊂  S(λ g0+(1-λ )g1) 
for 0<λ <1.  Hence, we have m(p,g0,u*) = inf{$⋅ p|$∈ S(g0)}; m(p,g1,u*) = inf{$⋅ p|$∈ S(g1)}; and m(p,λ g0 
+(1-λ )g1,u*) = inf{$⋅ p|$∈ S(λ g0  +(1-λ )g1)}.  Convexity in g requires λ m(p,g0,u*) +(1-λ )m(p,g1,u*)  ≥  
m(p,λ g0  +(1-λ )g1,u*).  The first expression can be rewritten λ m(p,g0,u*)+(1-λ )m(p,g1,u*) = 
inf{$⋅ p|$∈λ S(g0)+(1-λ ) S(g1)}.  But, inf{$⋅ p|$∈λ S(g0) + (1-λ )S(g1)} ≥  inf{$⋅ p|$∈ S(λ g0 +(1-λ )g1)} because 
λ S(g0) + (1-λ ) S(g1) ⊂  S(λ g0+(1-λ )g1).  Therefore, the expenditure function is convex in g (see Maler, 
1974). 
11 Examination of the shape of WTP yields no discernible tests since both theories predict that WTP is 
concave in g.  The interested reader should see Brookshire and Coursey (1987) for an early study that 
gathered numerous statements of compensation demanded.   16  
treatment for the private good trading treatments (Treatments A-D), roughly 30 subjects 
for each of the public good trading treatments (Treatments AP-DP), and 120 subjects in 
the auctions (Treatments WTA, WTP).   
Central tendencies of the variables reported in columns 1-3 of Table 1 are from 
the pooled trading treatment data and reveal that dealers are much more active traders 
(denoted trading intensity), and have had more years of market experience, than 
nondealers.  More importantly, within each of the dealer and nondealer subsamples there 
is a considerable amount of subject variability in the level of trading intensity and years 
of market experience, permitting an analysis of the effect of market experience on 
behavior.  In the data analysis below, I focus on the effects of trading intensity on 
behavior.  Yet I should note that if I use a measure of the stock of market experience—
the product of trading intensity and years of market experience—empirical results are 
qualitatively similarly.  Thus, I interchange “market intensity” and “market experience” 
for the remainder of this study. 
Table 2, which provides a summary of the trading data for both nondealers and 
dealers, can be read as follows:  row 1, column 1, at the intersection of “Treatment A” 
and “Number of Subjects Choosing A,” denotes that 25 nondealer subjects out of 31 (81 
percent) that were initially endowed with 0 mugs and 1 chocolate bar chose to keep the 
chocolate bar.  The figure in row 1, column 2, complements this result and indicates that 
6 out of 31 (19 percent) nondealers opted to trade their chocolate bar for the coffee mug.  
The third column in Table 2 presents Pearson chi-square tests, which examine the null 
hypothesis of Ho: pA = pB = pC = pD; where pi are the parameters of 4 independent 
binomially distributed random variables, and therefore the null hypothesis tests whether   17  
there is a treatment effect.  If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then evidence is in 
favor of neoclassical theory; rejection of the null (with the correct pi signs) provides 
evidence in favor of prospect theory. 
Overall, empirical results in panel A for ordinary consumers provide strong 
support for prospect theory.  As we move downward in column 1 of Table 2 from 
Treatment A to Treatment D, a considerable number of subjects exhibit behavior in line 
with prospect theory:  whereas 81 percent of nondealers choose point A in Treatment A, 
this percentage decreases significantly in Treatments B and C, and declines even further 
in Treatment D—to 23 percent.  The trading figures from Treatments A and D both 
suggest that subjects were about four times more likely to exit the experiment with their 
endowed good (computed as ½(Pi|i/Pi|j) + (Pj|j/Pj|i)).  A Pearson chi-square test (~3 degrees 
of freedom) suggests that the null hypothesis of no treatment effect should be rejected at 
the p < .01 level (χ
2 = 19.21).   
Examining behavior within the realm of a collective choice mechanism (in panel 
B of Table 2) reveals nearly identical insights—88 percent and 83 percent of subjects 
kept their endowed goods in treatments AP and AD, and slightly more than 50 percent of 
subjects opted for the chocolate bar in Treatments BP and CP.  A Pearson chi-square test 
again suggests that the homogeneity null should be rejected at the p < .01 level (χ
2 = 
34.79).  While there seems to be a slight tendency for subjects to exhibit a greater level of 
endowment in the collective choice treatments than in the individual choice treatments, 
the differences are not significant at conventional levels.  Accordingly, whether behavior 
is observed over private or collective allocation, the data for ordinary consumers provide 
strong support in favor of prospect theory.  This evidence, which is consistent with   18  
previous experimental studies, is at odds with conventional economic theory, which 
assumes that indifference curves are reversible.   
Panel C in Table 2 tells a much different story, however.  For example, the data 
are not in accord with prospect theory’s reference point prediction.  In fact, quite the 
contrary result emerges—the data clearly emerge in support of neoclassical theory.  First, 
prospect theory predicts that losses are weighted more heavily than gains.  Yet, of the 30 
subjects initially endowed with a chocolate bar (Treatment A), only 14, or 47 percent, 
keep the chocolate bar.  This trading pattern holds for Treatment D as well: 44 percent 
(14 of 32) of subjects trade their coffee mug for the chocolate bar.  The intermediate 
points provide a comforting validity check, as roughly 50 percent of subjects in 
Treatments B and C leave with mugs.  As neoclassical theory would predict, according to 
a Pearson chi-square test the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance levels (χ
2 = 0.59).   
Table 3 splits the data from Treatments A, D, AP, and DP into distinct 
“experience” subsamples to more fully explore the influence of market experience on the 
exchange rate.  While the experience thresholds may appear ad hoc, I used the mean (≈ 6) 
and standard deviation (≈ 6) of trading intensity as guidance.  Liberal changes to these 
thresholds do not significantly change the nature of the results.  The pooled data indicate 
that 18 percent of nondealers preferred an exchange.  Using a Fisher’s Exact test, I find 
that the null hypothesis of no endowment effect in the pooled data should be rejected at 
the p < .01 level (z = 7.32).  Even though exchange rates considerably increase as market 
experience increases, Fisher’s exact tests suggest that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected for those consumers that trade fewer than 6 times in a typical month   19  
(inexperienced consumers, row 2: z = 6.97) as well as for those consumers that make 6 or 
more trades in a typical month (experienced consumers, row 3: z = 3.48).   
When we move to intense consumers—those consumers who trade more than 12 
times per month, where 12 is roughly equivalent to the mean plus one standard 
deviation—a much different result emerges.  In these data, 56 percent of subjects 
preferred an exchange and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels (p 
= 0.64; z = 0.33).  Data from the dealer sample (contained in row 5 of Table 3) strongly 
reinforce empirical results from the intense consumer data:  48 percent of dealers 
preferred an exchange, and according to a Fisher’s exact test it is inappropriate to reject 
the null hypothesis of no endowment effect (p = 0.80; z = 0.23).   
To provide a visual characterization of the pooled trading data (pooled across 129 
dealers and 62 nondealers), I present Figure 3, which includes data across the 191 
subjects and makes the trade probability a function of trading intensity.  The figure 
clearly shows that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading 
experience intensifies—subjects who trade 11 or more times in a typical month conform 
well to neoclassical predictions. 
The second and third tests of prospect theory and neoclassical theory revolve 
around the auction data.  Following the analysis above, I begin by presenting Table 4, 
which provides sample statistics for WTA and WTP measures of value across several 
experience thresholds.  Again, in choosing thresholds for these samples, I considered 
both the mean number of trades in a typical month (≈ 5) and its standard deviation (≈ 5) 
(see Table 1).  A first important insight gained from Table 4 is the discrepancy between 
Hicksian equivalent surplus and Hicksian compensating surplus for the three candy bars   20  
in the pooled data (row 1).  While compensation demanded is $14.78, WTP is only $7.73.  
This value difference of nearly 50 percent is significant at the p < .01 level using a large-
sample t-test (t = 6.30) and suggests that preferences are inconsistent.12   
Parsing the data into subcategories yields insights that are consonant with the 
trading results: predictions from prospect theory are met in the inexperienced consumer 
group, as WTA3 ($18.36) is significantly greater than WTP3 ($7.54) at the p < .01 level (t 
= 7.30).  Yet data from the more experienced groups align with neoclassical predictions: 
neither experienced consumers’ values (WTA3=$10.10, WTP3=$7.89) nor intense 
consumers’ values (WTA3=$8.21, WTP3=$7.43) are significantly different at the p < .05 
level (experienced: t = 1.72; intense: t = 0.72).13  Interestingly, the convergence of values 
is entirely due to lower Hicksian equivalent surplus values among experienced agents—
inexperienced consumers provide a WTA3 value of $18.36, whereas intense consumers 
provide a WTA3 value ($8.21) that is $10.16 lower, a difference of 55 percent, which is 
significant at the p < .01 level (t = 6.70).  A comparison of WTP3 values across these 
same subject groups provides negligible value differences ($7.54 versus $7.43).   
The third test of the two theories requires a more careful exploration of the 
curvature of Hicksian equivalent surplus measures over the number of relinquished 
goods.  Table 5 presents summary statistics across the curvature measures for each of the 
subsamples.  Panel A in Table 5 provides means and standard deviations for the 
measures: 2WTA1 - WTA2, 3WTA1 - WTA3, 3WTA2 - 2WTA3, and WTA1+WTA3 - 
2WTA2.  Accordingly, a negative entry in panel A indicates a tendency toward concavity 
of compensation demanded, whereas a positive figure indicates a tendency toward 
                                                           
12 These results, and those discussed above, are consistent across parametric and non-parametric tests. 
13 Note that WTP is concave in g for all subsamples, as predicted by both theories.   21  
convexity.  The data pattern strongly supports results from the first two tests.  For 
inexperienced consumers, three out of the four measures support prospect theory:  at the 
p < .05 level the data in columns 1-3 all support concavity of the Hicksian equivalent 
surplus measures.  The fourth measure in column 4 is directionally correct but not 
significant at conventional levels.   
Data gathered from the experienced and intense consumer samples provide 
evidence that supports neoclassical predictions, as convexity of compensation demanded 
is evident.  For experienced consumers, the differences are significant at the p < .05 level 
for the first two column measures and at the p < .08 and p < .15 levels for the last two 
column measures.  For intense consumers the results become sharper, as significance is 
achieved at the p < .05 level for the first three column measures and at the p < .12 level 
for the fourth column measure.   
Panel B in Table 5 presents a much more disaggregated look at the WTA data by 
compiling the number of subjects that comply with neoclassical theory (denoted NT) and 
prospect theory (denoted PT) for each of the four curvature measures.14  Besides 
providing a robustness check of whether a few outliers are driving the results displayed in 
panel A, these figures provide a sense of individual-level behavior.  One can draw 
inference from these figures by moving up and down rows in any given column, or across 
columns in any given row.   
Overall, the data in panel B provide insights comparable to inference gained from 
panel A.  First, in the pooled data the number of subjects conforming to neoclassical 
                                                           
14 A zero value for any particular measure indicates linearity and is not counted as following either theory.  
Hence, the summation of the number of subjects following neoclassical theory and prospect theory for each 
measure is not equal to the total number of subjects that participated in the treatment. 
   22  
theory and prospect theory is roughly equivalent across all four curvature measures.   
Second, across the four curvature measures, 41-65 percent (18-29 percent) of 
inexperienced agents conform to prospect theory (neoclassical theory).  A test of 
proportions indicates that for curvature measures in columns 1-3, a significantly greater 
proportion of inexperienced agents conform to prospect theory than neoclassical theory (z 
= 2.76; z = 3.94; z = 2.46).   
Third, 50-70 percent (19-23 percent) of experienced agents are in line with 
neoclassical (prospect theory) predictions.  Using a test of proportions, I find that for all 
four curvature measures these differences are significant at the p < .05 level.  Fourth, 50-
72 percent (16-22 percent) of intense consumers conform to neoclassical predictions 
(prospect theory predictions).  Again, a proportions test indicates that in all four curvature 
cases these differences are significant at the p < .05 level.  Finally, comparing the 
proportion of subjects who conform to neoclassical theory or prospect theory across the 
inexperienced and experienced consumer samples, I find that for each of the four 
curvature measures, experienced (inexperienced) consumers are significantly more likely 
to behave in accordance with neoclassical theory (prospect theory).   
Although analysis of the raw data provides evidence that suggests market 
experience attenuates the anomaly, there has been no attempt to control other factors that 
may affect the propensity to trade or the bid/offer level.  These other subject-specific 
factors, which include years of market experience, gender, income, education, and age, can 
be adequately accounted for in an econometric model.  In Appendix E, I present a series of 
empirical results that are consistent with the unconditional results discussed above.  For   23  
example, market experience is found to influence trading rates and considerably influences 
Hicksian equivalent surplus measures, as suggested by the unconditional analysis.   
  Combining results from the entire set of exercises provides the following major 
insight: while prospect theory can go a long way in explaining behavior of naïve subjects, 
behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as subjects gain market experience.  
Figure 4 provides a summary of individual behavior across the WTA and WTP 
treatments.  The figure includes data across the 120 subjects and makes the WTA/WTP 
ratio a function of trading intensity.  Akin to Figure 3, Figure 4 clearly shows that 
individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience 
intensifies.  In light of the extant body of psychological evidence that reports limited 
transfer of learning across tasks, these results are quite surprising.   
The richness of the data also permits an examination of the underlying market 
learning process.  In this sense, the results in this study rule out many potential 
explanations that could not be discarded in previous data sets (e.g., List, 2003).  For 
example, preference uncertainty, subjects obtaining utility from the trading exercise, 
avoidance of dealing with informed agents when one is ill-informed, etc., cannot credibly 
explain all of the trading and auction results herein.15  Yet the data are broadly consistent 
with at least one potential explanation:  as aforementioned, recent findings suggest that 
the main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good one owns, but 
rather the pain of giving it up (Loewenstein and Kahneman, 1991).  Thus, via market 
interaction and numerous arbitrage opportunities, practiced agents may have learned to 
overcome this “pain” and treat the good leaving their endowment as an opportunity cost 
                                                           
15 While these data do not discern between treatment effects (learning) versus selection effects (subject 
pool), List (2003) presents evidence that suggests learning drives the observed behavioral differences.     24  
rather than a loss.  While psychological effects have been extremely popular in 
explaining the endowment effect anomaly, data herein suggest that psychological effects 
may also help to explain the attenuation of the anomaly.   
III.  Concluding Remarks 
  Indifference curves are traditionally drawn without reference to current 
entitlements.  In practice, this convention implies that with small income effects and 
many available substitutes differences between equivalent and compensating variation 
are negligible.  From a positive perspective, this assumption represents a necessary 
condition for the invariance result of Coase.  In a normative sense, this interpretation of 
indifference curves legitimizes cost/benefit analysis and provides a basis to resolve 
damage disputes.  Yet substantial evidence has mounted that illustrates the importance of 
entitlements:  in an influential experimental study, Kahneman et al. (1990) provide 
compelling evidence to reject the basic independence assumption.  These experimental 
findings have been robust across unfamiliar goods, such as irradiated sandwiches, and 
common goods, such as chocolate bars, persuading even the most ardent supporters of 
neoclassical theory to doubt the validity of certain neoclassical postulates.   
In this study, I make use of three clean tests that pit neoclassical theory against 
prospect theory.  I test the three hypotheses with data gathered from a naturally occurring 
market.  Examining trading patterns and bid/offer schedules in actual auctions for 
everyday consumables yields several unique insights.  First, prospect theory is found to 
have strong predictive power for inexperienced consumers across both the trading and 
auction treatments.  Second, for those consumers that have had a considerable amount of 
exchange opportunity in the sportscard marketplace, neoclassical theory predicts   25  
reasonably well, as I find sharp evidence that behavior approaches the neoclassical 
prediction for experienced agents.  In light of the extant body of psychological evidence 
that reports limited transfer of learning across tasks, these results are quite surprising.  
The tentative conclusion regarding the underlying learning process at work is that agents 
with intense market experience have learned to part with entitlements, suggesting 
attenuation of the anomaly appears to take place on the sell side of the market rather than 
on the buy side.   26  
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Table 1  Selected Characteristics of Participants 
 
 Trading  Treatments   Auction  Treatments 
 Dealers    Nondealers  Nondealers  Nondealers 
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
  (Std. dev.)    (Std. dev.)  (Std. dev.)  (Std. dev.) 
        WTA  WTP 
 
Trading intensity 11.81   4.94  6.88  5.07  5.23 
  (10.9)  (6.58)  (6.39)  (5.24)  (4.82) 
 
Yrs. of market  9.88  7.15  7.21  10.13   8.92 
experience  (9.79)  (9.83)  (8.03)  (10.71)   (9.90) 
 
Income   4.15  4.10  4.18  3.55  3.78 
  (1.75)  (1.69)  (1.81)  (2.27)  (2.24) 
 
Age  36.55  34.54  37.04  31.74  31.61 
  (13.1)    (14.41) (14.1) (13.42)    (14.38) 
 
Gender (% male) 0.94  0.85  0.82  0.83  0.83 
  (0.24)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
 
Education  3.54  3.44  3.54  3.51  3.48 
  (1.40)  (1.33)  (1.54)  (1.70)  (1.68) 
 
Sample Sizes 
Treatment A  30  31  ---  ---  --- 
Treatment B  32  30  ---  ---  --- 
Treatment C  35  33  ---  ---  --- 
Treatment D 32  30  ---  ---  --- 
Treatment AP   ---  ---  33  ---  --- 
Treatment BP  ---  ---  28  ---  --- 
Treatment CP  ---  ---  29  ---  --- 
Treatment DP  ---  ---  35  ---  --- 
WTA/WTP  ---  ---  ---  60  60 
Notes: 
1.  Trading intensity represents the number of trades made in a typical month. 
2.  Yrs. of market experience denotes years that the subject has been active in the market. 
3.  Income denotes categorical variable (1-8): 1) Less than $10,000, 2) $10,000 to $19,999, 3) $20,000 to 
$29,999, 4) $30,000 to $39,999, 5) $40,000 to $49,999, 6) $50,000 to $74,999, 7) $75,000 to $99,999 8) 
$100,000 or over. 
4.  Age denotes actual age in years. 
5.  Gender denotes categorical variable: 0 if female, 1 if male. 
6.  Education denotes categorical variable 1) Eighth grade or less, 2) High School 3) 2-Year College, 4) 
Other Post-High School, 5) 4-Year College, 6) Graduate School Education.   28  
Table 2  Experimental Results for Trading Treatments 
 
 
    Number of Subjects  Number of Subjects   
    Choosing A  Choosing D  Pearson χ
2 
Panel A.  Nondealers  
  Treatment A  25 (81%)  6 (19%)  19.21 (3 df) 
  Treatment B  18 (60%)  12 (40%) 
  Treatment C  15 (45%)  18 (55%) 
  Treatment D  7 (23%)  23 (77%) 
 
Panel B.  Nondealers  
  Treatment AP  29 (88%)  4 (12%)  34.79 (3 df) 
  Treatment BP  16 (57%)  12 (43%) 
  Treatment CP  17 (59%)  12 (41%) 
  Treatment DP  6 (17%)  29 (83%) 
 
Panel C.  Dealers  
  Treatment A  14 (47%)  16 (53%)  0.54 (3 df) 
  Treatment B  14 (44%)  18 (56%) 
  Treatment C  18 (51%)  17 (49%) 
  Treatment D  14 (44%)  18 (56%) 
 
Notes:   
1.  Initial endowment levels are as follows: Treatment A = (0,1); Treatment B = (1,1); Treatment C = 
(0,0); Treatment D = (1,0), where (University of Arizona coffee mug, chocolate bar) are the private 
goods.  Treatments AP, BP, CP, and DP are public good analogs of Treatments A-D. 
2.  Pearson Chi-Square test, which is distributed with 3 degrees of freedom, has a null hypothesis of 
Hicksian preferences, or that the proportions of subjects choosing A and D are equivalent across 
treatments. 
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Table 3  Summary Trading Statistics  
 
    Preferred  p-value for  
Group  Exchange  Fisher’s exact test     
 
Pooled nondealers (n = 129)  0.18 (0.38)  <0.01 
 
Inexperienced consumers   0.08 (0.27)  <0.01 
(< 6 trades monthly; n = 74) 
 
Experienced consumers   0.31 (0.47)  <0.01 
(≥  6 trades monthly; n = 55) 
 
Intense consumers   0.56 (0.51)  0.64 
(≥  12 trades monthly; n = 16) 
 
Pooled dealers (n = 62)  0.48 (0.50)    0.80 
 
Notes:   
1.  Data are from Treatments A, D, AP, and DP. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
2.  Experienced consumers are those consumers who trade 6 or more times per month (6 is 
roughly the mean level of monthly trades).  Intense consumers trade 12 or more times per 
month (12 is roughly the mean plus one standard deviation).  
3.  Fisher’s exact test has a null hypothesis of no endowment effect.   30  
Table 4  WTA/WTP Sample Statistics Across Consumer Types 
 
 WTA1 WTA2 WTA3 WTP1 WTP2 WTP3 
  Mean Mean Mean  Mean Mean    Mean 
Group  (Std. dev.) (Std. dev.) (Std. dev.)   (Std. dev.) (Std. dev.) (Std. dev.) 
 
Pooled 
  Bid or Offer 5.58  10.04  14.78  4.11 5.99 7.73 
 (WTA,  n=60)  (3.7)  (5.4)  (7.0) (2.5)  (3.6)  (5.0) 
  (WTP, n=60)  
 
Inexperienced consumers   
  Bid or Offer  7.75  13.16  18.36  4.08 5.91 7.54 
 (WTA,  n=34)  (3.5)  (4.6)  (6.1) (3.0)  (3.7)  (5.2) 
  (WTP, n=27) 
  
Experienced consumers 
  Bid or Offer 2.74 5.96  10.10  4.14 6.05 7.89 
 (WTA,  n=26)  (1.31)  (3.0)  (5.0) (2.0)  (3.5)  (4.8) 
  (WTP, n=33) 
 
Intense consumers 
  Bid or Offer  2.29 5.00 8.21  3.87 6.28 7.43 
 (WTA,  n=18)  (0.83)  (1.9)  (2.5) (1.8)  (3.3)  (3.7) 
 (WTP,  n=15) 
 
Note:  “Inexperienced” consumers are those that trade fewer than 5 times in a typical month; 
“Experienced” consumers are those that trade 5 or more times in a typical month; “Intense” consumers are 
those that trade 10 or more times per month.  In choosing these thresholds, I considered both the mean 
number of trades in a typical month (≈ 5) and its standard deviation (≈ 5) (see Table 1).  Thus, 
“Inexperienced” consumers are those subjects who are below the average trading rate; “Experienced” 
consumers are those subjects who are above the average trading rate; and “Intense” consumers are those 
consumers at least one standard deviation above the average trading rate.      31  
Table 5  WTA Summary Results Across Consumer Types 
 
 
 WTA2-2WTA1  WTP3-3WTA1 2WTA3-3WTA2  WTA1+WTA3–2WTA2 
 Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Group  (Std. dev.)  (Std. dev.)  (Std. dev.)   (Std. dev.)   
Panel A:  Aggregate data 
 
Pooled -1.12*  -1.96  -0.56  0.28 
(n=60) (4.0)  (8.1)  (7.3)  (3.4) 
    
Inexperienced  -2.35*  -4.91*  -2.76*  -0.20 
consumers (4.9)  (9.2)  (7.1)  (3.5) 
(n=34) 
    
Experienced  0.50*  1.89*  2.32  0.92 
consumers (1.2)  (4.1)  (6.6)  (3.2) 
(n=26) 
 
Intense   0.43* 1.34*  1.42*  0.50 
consumers (0.8)  (1.8)  (3.2)  (1.7) 
(n=18) 
    
Panel B:  Individual data—number of subjects satisfying each theory 
   
  NT  PT NT  PT NT  PT NT  PT 
Pooled  20  23  24  27  25  25  25  20 
(n=60) 
    
Inexperienced  7   18  6   22  9   19  10  14 
consumers  
(n=34) 
    
Experienced   13   5  18   5  16   6  15   6 
consumers  
(n=26) 
    
Intense   9  3  13   3  13   3  11   4 
consumers   
(n=18) 
 
Notes:  For definition of consumer types please see Table 4.  NT and PT denote neoclassical theory and 
prospect theory.  Figures in Panel B on the number of subjects following each theory is determined by the 
signs of the four measures:  WTA2-2WTA1, WTP3-3WTA1, 2WTA3-3WTA2, and WTA1+WTA3–2WTA2.  
A positive value (implying convexity in the number of goods relinquished) is in favor of neoclassical 
theory whereas a negative value (implying concavity in the number of goods relinquished) favors prospect 
theory.  A zero value indicates linearity and is not counted as following either theory; hence, the summation 
of the number of subjects following NT and PT for each convexity measure is not equal to the total number 
of subjects that participated.  In panel A, a * indicates value is significantly different from zero at the p < 
.05 level. 
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Figure 3.  Summary of Trading Results 






















Figure 4.  Summary of WTA/WTP Ratios 
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Appendix A  Private Good Trading Treatments Survey 
 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only.  THIS INFORMATION 
WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON 
COMPLETION OF THE STUDY. 
 
1. How long have you been active in the sportscards and memorabilia market?   
_______yrs 
 
2.  Approximately how many trades (cards or memorabilia) do you make in a typical 
month? _______.  Note that trades could include pokemon cards, sportscards, other 
trading cards, and sports memorabilia. 




3.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer?________ 
 
4.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
 
5.  Age   ______            Date of Birth   ____________ 
 
6.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed. (Circle one)    
     1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
     2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
 
7.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
    1) Less than $10,000        5) $40,000 to $49,999 
    2) $10,000 to $19,999      6) $50,000 to $74,999 
    3) $20,000 to $29,999      7) $75,000 to $99,999 
    4) $30,000 to $39,999      8) $100,000 or over   35  
Appendix B  Summary of the Instructions for Public Goods Treatment AP 
 
Welcome!!  For participating in today’s experiment, we give you a Swiss fine 
extra large chocolate bar, which should be in front of you.  Today you have the 
opportunity to vote on whether “Mr. Twister”, this small metal box, will be 
“funded”.  If “Mr. Twister” is funded, I will turn the handle and N [the amount of 
people in the room] University of Arizona coffee mugs will be distributed—one 
to each participant [illustrate].  To fund Mr. Twister, all of you will have to give 




Everyone in the room will contribute their chocolate bar to the fund.  The 
contribution will be used for the purpose of funding Mr. Twister, a mechanism 
that if funded will distribute one University of Arizona coffee mug to everyone 
[illustrate].   
 
Referendum Rules 
•  If more than 50% of you vote YES on this proposition, all of you will give me 
your chocolate bar.  In return, “Mr. Twister” will be funded and I will crank the 
handle, providing one University of Arizona coffee mug to each participant 
[illustrate].   
 
•  If 50% or fewer of you vote YES on this proposition, no one will give me 
their chocolate bar and “Mr. Twister” will not be funded.  Hence, no one will 
receive a University of Arizona coffee mug.   
 
Any questions?  You should note that it is in your best interest to truthfully reveal your 
preferences—if you want to keep the chocolate bar, vote NO on the proposition.  If you 
prefer the mug, vote YES on the proposition. 
 
I now want you to complete the decision sheet.   36  
Appendix C  Decision Sheet for the Public Good Treatments 
 
My vote for the proposition is (please circle one response): 
   Y E S       N O  
Please sign the line below to verify your vote.   
Signature_______________________________ 
We now want to ask you a few more questions.  These questions will be used for statistical 
purposes only.  THIS INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION OF THE STUDY. 
 
1. How long have you been active in the sportscards and memorabilia market?  _______yrs 
2.  Approximately how many trades (cards or memorabilia) do you make in a typical 
month? _______.  Note that trades could include Pokemon cards, sportscards, other trading 
cards, and sports memorabilia.   
Has your trading rate changed over time?  Why? 
 
 
3.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer?________ 
4.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
5.  Age   ______            Date of Birth   ____________ 
6.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed? (Circle one)    
     1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
     2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
7.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
    1) Less than $10,000        5) $40,000 to $49,999 
    2) $10,000 to $19,999      6) $50,000 to $74,999 
    3) $20,000 to $29,999      7) $75,000 to $99,999 
    4) $30,000 to $39,999      8) $100,000 or over   37  
Appendix D  Subject Instructions for WTP Vickrey Second-Price Auction 
 
Welcome to Lister’s Auctions.  The money that I have just given you is yours to keep—
thanks for participating!  You now have the opportunity to bid in an auction for the candy 
bars on the table.   
 
Auction Rules: 
A sealed bid second-price auction will be used to determine the winner of the 
auction.  Thus, if your bid of $X is the highest bid and the next highest bid is $X-Z, you win 
the auction but only pay $X-Z.  Under this bidding mechanism it is best for you to bid your 
true value because overbidding may cause you to pay too much and underbidding decreases 
your odds of winning the auction.   
I will accept bids until Sunday at 5PM.  On Monday morning I will order the bids 
from highest to lowest in order to determine the winner.   
 





The bidder who bid $A wins the auction and pays $B.   
 
Note that there are three candy bars on the table.  I am going to have you place 
three bids.  The first bid will be your bid for 1 of the candy bars—this is called auction 1.  
Your second bid will be your bid for 2 of the candy bars—this will be auction 2.  Your 
third bid will be your bid for all 3 of the candy bars—this will be auction 3.   
But, it is important to note that only one of the three auctions will be for real.  To 
decide which one is for real, on Sunday night at 5PM I will roll the six-sided on the table.  
If a 1 or 2 is rolled, the first auction will be for real; a roll of 3 or 4 and the second 
auction will be for real; finally, a roll of 5 or 6 and the third auction will be for real.   
Note that in this setting it is optimal for you to bid your true value in each of the 
three auctions.   
Given that the winner of the auction will pay a price equal to the amount of the 
second-highest bid, please place your bids below: 
1 candy bar   $_____  2 candy bars   $_____3 candy bars   $______ 
After the winner pays me cash or check, the good(s) will be awarded to the 
winner (we pay postage).  Please sign the dotted line below to verify your bids.  Also, 
please provide your name, telephone number and mailing address below: 
 
Signature__________________________Printed Name__________________________ 
Address___________________________ or email_____________________________ 
Phone#_________________________________   38  
Appendix E  Conditional Data Analysis 
 
To provide a robustness test of the unconditional results presented in the text, this 
Appendix presents empirical results that condition on factors that may influence trading 
rates and bids/offers.  For the trading rate data, I estimate the following logit model using 
data from Treatments A, D, AP, and DP: 
trade = g(α  + β `X) ,            ( 1 E )  
where trade equals 1 if a trade was executed, 0 otherwise; g(• ) is the standard logit 
function; and X includes subject-specific variables that may affect the propensity to trade.  
Variables in X are listed in Table 1 and include the number of trades in a typical month, 
years of market experience, yearly income, age, gender, education, and a series of 
dichotomous variables indicating the initial endowment point.  Estimation of equation (1) 
therefore provides insights into the factors that influence a subject’s propensity to trade.   
To provide conditional insights into the auction data, I estimate the following 
bid/offer model: 
Y = f(α  + β `X) ,        ( 2 E )  
where Y is subject i’s bid or offer; X includes subject-specific variables that may affect 
the bid or offer.  Variables in X are noted above.  For the WTP equation, I use a Tobit 
specification since there are zero bids in the data. 
Summary estimates of equations (1E) and (2E) are presented in Table E on the 
following page.  In the trading specifications contained in columns 1 and 2, the emphasis 
is on the sign and magnitude of the response coefficients, as the treatment dummies 
merely control for starting points.  These empirical results suggest that for certain subject 
pools, the propensity to trade and trading intensity are positively related.  For nondealers, 
the logit coefficient estimate of 0.11 is significantly different from zero at the p < .01 
level, suggesting market intensity has a positive influence on the propensity to trade mugs 
and chocolate bars.  Alternatively, the effect of trading intensity for dealers (logit 
coefficient of 0.02) is considerably weaker and not significant at conventional levels (t ≈  
1.2).  For comparison purposes, the dealer trading intensity coefficient is statistically 
different from the nondealer coefficient estimate at conventional levels, which may 
suggest that some dealers have had substantial opportunity to interact in a market setting, 
rendering the marginal impact of another trade less important.  If I examine a measure of 
the stock of market experience—the product of trading intensity and years of market 
experience—empirical results are qualitatively similarly.16   
The auction specifications presented in columns 3 and 4 focus on bids (and offers) 
from the three goods auction (results are not qualitatively different across the one and two 
goods specifications).  The empirical results strongly support the unconditional findings.  
For example, the coefficient estimate of trading intensity in the WTA specification is 
significantly different from zero at the p < .01 level and implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in intensity (≈  5.2) is correlated with a $3.70 decrease in WTA.   
Results from the WTP specification suggest that market intensity is not an important 
                                                           
16 Note that given the design of the experiment the maximum probability the subject should trade is ½, not 
1 as in the logit framework.  Thus, the econometric model as specified is not consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis that, as experience intensifies, the probability of trading tends to ½.  To rectify this potential 
shortcoming, I estimated a non-parametric model that involves mixing categorical and continuous kernels.  
Results from these models are consonant with the logit estimates.   39  
marginal influence on WTP values.  Again, I should note that if I examine a measure of 





Table E  Summary Empirical Estimation Results 
 
 Trading  Treatments Auction  Treatments 
 Dealers    Nondealers  Nondealers    Nondealers 
Variable  Trade Function   Trade Function  WTA Function    WTP Function 
 
Constant -0.20(1.93)    -3.62(1.46)**  17.86(3.40)**   4.64(3.01) 
 
Trading  0.02(0.02)    0.11  (0.04)**  -0.74(0.13)**    0.09(0.60) 
intensity      
 
Yrs. of   -0.06(0.05)    0.04(0.03)  -0.01(0.07)  -0.08(0.09) 
market experience      
 
Income 0.14(0.17)    0.26(0.18)  0.05(0.36)    -0.38(0.41) 
      
Age 0.003(0.03)    0.001(0.02)  -0.03(0.07)    0.01(0.06) 
 
Gender -2.68(1.53)*    0.09(0.75)  2.10(2.20)    3.79(1.91)** 
 
Education  0.69(0.26)**   0.05(0.21)  -0.02(0.03)    0.17(0.33) 
 
Treatment D  -0.98(0.66)    0.15(0.72)  ---  --- 
 
Treatment AP  ---    -1.03(0.82)  ---  ---   
 
Treatment DP  ---    -0.55  (0.75)  ---  --- 
 
R
2  ---   ---  0.37   --- 
 
N  58    121  55  47 
Notes:
 
1.  In the trading treatments, the dependent variable equals 1 if subject chose to trade, 0 otherwise.  In the 
auction treatments, the dependent variable is the individual’s offer (or bid) in the three goods auction.  In 
the WTP function, I estimate a Tobit model and present marginal effects computed at the sample means.  
Gender = 1 if male, 0 otherwise; Treatment i = 1 if subject was in treatment i, 0 otherwise. 
2.  Standard errors are in parentheses beside coefficient estimates.   
3.  Sample sizes may not match with sample sizes in Table 1 due to some respondents not including income 
responses.  Reported results omit these observations.  If means are used to fill in the missing observations, 
results are not quantitatively or qualitatively different from the results reported. 
4.  **(*)Denotes coefficient estimate is significant at the p < .05 (.10) level. 